Internal frauds in the banking industry represent a huge cost and this problem is particularly difficult to solve because, by construction, swindlers being very imaginative persons, the fraud schemata evolves continuously. Fraud detection systems must then learn from the continuously new fraud schematas, making them difficult to design. This paper proposes a new theoretical and practical approach to detect internal frauds and to model fraud schematas. This approach is based on a particular method of abstraction that reduces the complexity of the problem from O(n 2 ) to O(n) making its implementation in a an Java program that detects and models the frauds in real time and online with a simple professional personal computer. The results of this program are presented with its application on a real-world fraud provided by a world wide French bank.
INTRODUCTION
Since the last three decades, the theoretical researches in the econometrics and the financial analysis domain have developed a stochastic approach of the analysis and the modeling of financial datas that are currently largely used in the bank and the financial industries (Fliess et al., 2011) . During this period, the exponential development of the information system of the bank and the financial companies allowed the usage of Data Mining or Machine Learning algorithms to define new services, notably to bring elements to solve the problem of the internal fraud detection in the bank industry. But this problem is particularly difficult to solve because, by construction, swindlers being very imaginative persons, the models of fraud evolve continuously so that the fraud detection systems must learn from the new fraud schematas. This paper proposes a new theoretical and practical approach to detect internal frauds and to model fraud schematas thanks to a reduction of the complexity of the problem from O(n 2 ) to O(n). The proposed solution allows to detect and model internal frauds online, in real time, with a simple professional personal computer, this latter being able of handling more than 4 billions of transactions a day. The next Section describes the works related with the proposed approach. Section 3 introduces the mains concepts of the Timed Observations Theory (TOT, (Le Goc, 2006) ) that are required for the online fraud detection and modeling from bank transactions. This framework has been implemented in the TOM4FFS program (Timed Observations Mining for Fraud Fighting System) and its results on the detection and the modeling of a real world, and particularly complex, example of internal fraud schemata concerning a world wide French bank are provided in Section 4. The Section 5 concludes this paper.
RELATED WORKS
To solve the general fraud detection problem, many statistic and machine learning techniques have been developed such as neural networks (Fanning and Cogger, 1998; Green and Choi, 1997) , genetic algorithms (Hoogs and al., 2007) , bayesian network and decision tree (Kirkos and al., 2007; Phua et al., 2004) , K-nearest neighbour (Kotsiantis and al., 2006) , logistic regression (Altman et al., 1994) and even rulebased fuzzy reasoning system (Deshmukh and Talluru, 1998) . They have been used with more or less success in operation (cf. for example (Roddick and Spiliopoulou, 2002) for a complete state of the art about these techniques). Technically speaking, the main difficulties with these approaches are concerned with (i) the data set representativity and completeness problem and (ii) the high power of computation that most of the learning algorithms require to learn and to detect the fraud schemata from the huge amount of transactions that a bank handles each day. As a consequence, most of the solutions can't be used online in real-time at low costs. On the other hand, the paper (Fliess et al., 2011) puts on the light a conceptual problem that is inherent to all statistics-based approaches: the effect of the sampling on the datas. Usually, the quantity of raw data is so huge that one uses stochastic models to aggregate the raw datas in a minimal set of samples, with a reduced set of dimensions that maximizes the compactness of the learning space so that learning algorithms can work efficiently. This usual method introduces, in a devious way (often without the analysts realize it), the problem of the loss of causality in data. Having very small effects on most of the cases, this problem can be (and is) generally neglected. Nevertheless, it is significant and important when the timestamps of the raw data are pertinents for the calculations: in that case, biases are then introduced into both structure and value of the parameters of the learning models. And it becomes crucial when dealing with online data flows that must be analyzed in real time. Since most of the proposed Data Mining algorithms have been designed for non timed data, some extensions have been proposed to this aim as for example, AprioriAll (Agrawal and Srikant, 1995) or Winepi/Winepi (Mannila et al., 1995; Mannila et al., 1997) . But, according to (Mannila, 2002) or (Han and Kamber, 2006) , these algorithms present two main drawbacks: the number of discovered models increases in a nonlinear way with (i) the a priori setting of the values of the algorithm parameters and (ii) the threshold values of the decision criteria, even when only a very small fraction of these models are interesting. There are few papers dealing with the problem of fraud detection in online banking (Phua and al., 2010; Jans et al., 2009; Wei and al., 2012) . Most of them concern external fraud detection in application domains far from banking industry. To solve these problems, the TOT defines a new Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD) approach, specifically designed to learn directly from timed data, without any parameter. The theoretical basis of this KDD approach, implemented in the TOM4FFS program, are described in the next sections.
INTRODUCTION TO THE TOT
The TOT defines a dynamic process as an arbitrarily constituted set X(t) = {x 1 (t), ..., x n (t)} of timed functions x i (t) of continuous time t. The set X(t) of functions implicitly defines a set X = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n } of n variable names denoted x i for simplicity. A dynamic process X(t) is said to be observed by a program Θ when this latter aims at writting timed messages describing the modifications over time of the functions x i (t) of X(t). The aim of the TOT is precisely to model observed processes defined as a couple (X(t), Θ(X, ∆)). To this aim, the TOT defines a timed observation to provide a meaning to a timed message:
..n be a set of time functions describing the evolution of a process that is observed by a program Θ; let Γ = {t k } t k ∈ℜ be a set of arbitrary time instants in which Θ observes the functions; let θ(x θ , δ θ ,t θ ) be a predicate implicitly determined by Θ; and let ∆ = {δ j } be a set of constant values.
A timed observation (δ j ,t k ) ∈ ∆ × Γ made on the time function x i (t) is the assignation of values x i , δ j and t k to the predicate θ(
The TOT notion of observation class makes the link between a variable x i and a constant δ j .
..n be a set of time functions that are observed by an abstract program θ(X, ∆) where ∆ = {δ j } j=1...m is the set of all the constants the abstract program can use and X = {x i } i=1...n is the set of variable names corresponding to X(t).
A timed observation (δ j ,t k ) always can be considered as an occurrence O j (t k ) of an observation class O j = {(x i , δ j )}. In practice, temporal functions x i (t) describing the evolution of the process are piecewise functions (see section 4).
Definition 3. Concrete Unary Observer A concrete unary observer Θ ({x i }, Z) is a program observing a piecewise function and implementing equation 1 to produce timed observations of the form
.} of instances of the observation class occurrences O i (t k i ).
A temporal binary relation is the representation of a sequential relation between two observations classes O i and O j :
is an oriented relation between two observation classes O i and O j that is timed constrained with the [τ
is the time interval to observe the timed observation O j (t j ) = (δ j ,t j ) of the output observation class O j after the timed observa-
In that case, the temporal binary re-
is an Abstract Binary Observer.
is a timed observation and an occurrence of an abstract observation class O i j = {(x i j , δ i j )} linking an abstract variable x i j with the abstract binary constant δ i j ≡ (δ i , δ j ).
APPLICATION
The aim of this section is to present the application of the TOM4FFS program to detect and to model schemata of potential internal fraud. An internal fraud is a particular sequence of non-compliant transactions the aim of which is to move money from clients accounts to some accounts of a tactless manager of a bank. The role of TOM4FFS is to detect and to model, online and in real time, a schemata of potential internal fraud from a continuous flow of transactions. The detected transactions remain potentially fraudulent until their non-compliance have been confirmed. The fraud schemata of this example is based on a set of pairs (a k i (t k i ), a k j (t k j )) of transactions where the first transaction a k i (t k i ) sells an amount a k i of money from an account of a customer before the second transaction a k j (t k j ) credits the same amount to one of the accounts of the administrator of the bank. The problem is then to find the minimal set of transaction pairs (a k i (t k i ), a k j (t k j )) satisfying the following constraints: (i) from a customer account which is not an account of the manager, (ii) to an account of a manager, (iii) where a k i = −a k j and (iv) t k i ≤ t k j . It is clear that given a database of n transactions, the complexity of this problem is O(n 2 ): when n is evaluated in millions (i.e. 10 6 ), the number of pairs to evaluate must be evaluated in millions of millions (i.e. 10 12 ), making the problem difficult for humans as for computers. As an illustration, the internal fraud schemata studied in this section has been detected by a client and required an analysis of 6 months for the bank's expert in internal fraud. It is to precise that the studied example is considered as particularly complicated by this expert. According to the TOT, a bank transaction a k i (t k i ) is a timed observation ((x i (t k i ) − x i (t k i −1 ),t k i ) associated with a bank account x i (t) of a particular customer. In this application, since it will be seen that the cents can be neglected in a first step, x i (t) is considered as a piecewise constant time function defined over Z (cf. figure  2 for an illustration). The constant (x i (t k i ) − x i (t k i −1 )) is the amount of money that has been moved from the account x i (t) at time t k i : it is a natural number of cents, which is positive when the account x i (t) is credited and negative either. . The other items, the customer number, the account number, the type of the transaction and the index of the transaction are then considered as attributes of the timed observations. These attributes are defined with an ontology describing the customers, the accounts and the types of transactions with frames similarly to the Manchester OWL syntax. As a consequence, a timed observation (−189.64, 2009/09/2915 : 45 : 25) is both an instance of a frame customer, a frame account or a frame type of transactions. In the suite of this section, a fraud schemata is represented with a set of binary relations between customer's accounts. The problem with this representation of the transaction is that, the number of constant δ is a priori infinite (i.e. equal to ℵ 0 , the cardinal of Z). Recalling that an observation class O i = {(x i , δ i )} is a singleton associating a constant δ i with one and only one variable name x i (cf. definition 2), the number of observation classes is also infinite. As a consequence, the set of timed binary relations that are required to recognize all the possible pairs of transactions (a k i (t k i ), a k j (t k j )) from (i) a customer account to (ii) an account of a manager where (iii) a k i = −a k j and (iv) t k i ≤ t k j is also infinite. When forgetting the cents, the constants δ i ≡ ((x i (t k i ) − x i (t k i −1 )) of each of these timed observations can then be any natural number of Z. So, an infinite set of timed binary relations is required to constitute the pairs of transactions satisfying the required logical constraints. To solve this problem, the idea is to define a compact representation of the amounts, inspired from the Benford's Law (Benford, 1938) , also called the First-Digit Law. An amount m = (x i (t k i ) − x i (t k i −1 )) of a transaction can be represented with a signed sum of powers of 10: ∀z ∈ Z, z = s(z) · ∑ n k=0 a k · 10 k . In this representation, (i) s(z) is the sign function of z i.e. s : Z → {−1, 1}, z → −1 if z < 0, 1 otherwise, (ii) n is the highest power of 10 of z (n ≥ 0), (iii) a k ∈ D = {1, 2, ..., 8, 9} is the digit defining the value of the coefficient of the k th power of z. With the First-Digit Law in mind, the advantage of this representation, when using only the digits of D, it is possible to the following classification function to represent the set of transaction's amount with a much more smaller set O = {O i } of observation classes O i :
The classification function µ maps any z ∈ Z to a particular µ(z) of the set M = {..., -21, ..., -11, -9, -8, ..., -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, ..., 8, 9, 11, ..., 21, ...
The classification function µ(z) only uses the first digit of z and n, its highest power of 10. In practice, the TOM4FFS program is set with a maximum value n max of power of 10 to create a finite set O of (20 · n max + 1) observation classes to analyze transactions the amounts of which are contained in the range [−(10.n max + 1); 10.n max + 1]. For example, with n max = 9, the highest digit of D, TOM4FFS creates 181 observation classes
to take into account amounts contained in the range ] − 10 9 ; 10 9 [ (i.e. a billion). This interval is largely sufficient to the aim of the internal fraud detection. With these 181 observation classes, TOM4FFS creates (i) a unique concrete unary observer Θ i ({φ i }, Z) implementing the classification function µ of definition 6 where φ i is the name of an abstract time function φ i (t) that transforms the transaction's amounts s(z) · ∑ n k=0 a k · 10 k in occurrences O k (t k ), and (ii) a network of 181 ABO's, each of them being specified with a timed binary relation of the form
where O i and O j are opposite value of the µ classification function. So, since the µ classification function is only concerned with 10.n + a n , the default structure of the ABO (cf. equation 2) is independent of the customer, the account and the type of transaction: it is only concerned with the checking of the classes and the time constraint [τ
. The ABO's are then set with (i) a predicate equal to evaluate the constraint of equality of the true values of the amount transactions (i.e. the cents are taken into account) and (ii) two simple propositions to check if the transactions are concerned with a costumer (and not the manager) for constraint 1 and the manager uniquely for constraint 2. The studied database Ω is composed of 1492 transactions (cf. figure 1) between the bank administrator (ID CLI = 1003) and his 3 clients (ID CLI ∈ {1001, 1002, 1004}). This concerns 30 banking accounts (column ID CPTE) and 40 transactions types (column ID TYP EVT) numbered from 3001 to 3040. Client 1001 owns 8 accounts: 2006 , 2008 , 2009 , 2012 , 2013 , 2014 , 2015 and 2022 . Client 1002 owns 5 accounts: 2005 , 2011 , 2019 , 2023 and 2027 . Bank administrator owns 10 accounts: 2001 , 2002 , 2003 , 2004 , 2024 , 2026 , 2028 , 2029 , 2030 and 2031 . Client 1004 owns 7 accounts 2007 , 2010 , 2016 , 2017 , 2018 , 2020 , 2021 . Those transactions cover a period of more than one year, from 2009/01/02 to 2010/03/12 and involve amount of money from -445 200C to 460 614.36 C. The aim is to find among these transactions, those who are potentially fraudulent. The set of constant ∆ is the set M of the definition 6 so that O is the set of observation classes. Let Γ = {t k ,t k ∈ Ω} be the set of time instants contained in the database Ω. Fraud detection and modelisation are presented here by observing three different processes: accounts, clients and transactions types processes. Each process X(t) = {x i (t), i = 1...n X } is made with n X piecewise timed functions. So each unary observer Θ i ({x i }, Z) implementing equation 1 generates a sequence of timed observations dated by the internal fraud expert of the French bank: the manager stole a total of 104 000C from two costumers, 1004 (49 000 C) and 1001 (55 000 C). Now let's observe clients process and consider here the process X(t) = {x 1001 (t), ..., x 1004 (t)} made with 4 piecewise timed functions x i (t) defined on Z corresponding to the 3 client ids (ID CLI ∈ {1001, 1002, 1004}) and the bank administrator id (ID CLI = 1003) contained in the database Ω. The same methodology as previously presented is applied and leads to the fraud scheme shown in figure 5 . This confirms the fact that the manager has stolen a total of 104 000C from two clients: 49 000C from client 1004 and 55 000C from client 1001. Finally, to observe transactions types process, let's consider here the process X(t) = {x 3001 (t), ..., x 3040 (t)} made with 40 piecewise timed functions x i (t) defined on Z corresponding to the 40 transactions types ids contained in the database Ω. Figure 6 shows which types of transactions are involved in the fraud scheme. The manager uses five types of transactions among the 40 to steel his clients. Since the last three decades, Data Mining or Machine Learning algorithms are used to pursue the delicate problem of the fraud detection in the bank industry. These algorithms pose three main problems: (i) the strong reluctance with which the bankers agree to supply in a third party a set of real-world transactions for confidentiality reasons, (ii) the problem of the data set representativity, and to a lesser extent, its completeness, and (iii) the huge amount of transactions that must be analyzed to detect the potential frauds. This paper presents an operational program, called TOM4FFS, to solve these three problems. The main advantages of this method are (i) to be purely syntactic what guarantees a strict confidentiality and (ii) to reduce the complexity of the problem of the fraud detection from O(n 2 ) to O(n). The TOM4FFS program is then able to handle more than 4 billions of transactions a day, online and in real time, with a standard personal computer. This paper describes the TOM4FFS program and its application to a real-world fraud example of a world wide French bank. Our current works are concerned with the extension of the approach to more complex fraud schemata and its application to the general problem of the conformity in the banking and other industries.
